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Abstract
During the summer of 2014, the terrorist organization Islamic State (commonly referred to as
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS) garnered international attention after its unprecedented
territorial acquisitions and violence in the Middle East. Today, ISIS vies with al-Qaeda for
leadership of the global Islamic Extremist movement and has extended its violence all over the
world, including the United States. U.S. based supporters generally choose to engage with the
ideology in one of three categories: as a foreign fighter, domestic plotter, or domestic nonplotter. Despite this threat, there is very little quantitative research concerning U.S. ISIS
supporters and the incidents they plan.
Utilizing data from the American Terrorism Study (ATS), the current study compares ISIS
perpetrators across the three support type categories, as well as ISIS and al-Qaeda and
Associated Movements (AQAM) affiliated persons and incidents in the United States. I
conducted Chi Square and Conjunctive Analysis of Case Configurations to determine significant
differences.
The analysis indicated significant difference across ISIS support types with regard to gender
and age of the individuals, and suggested common patterns in the types of individuals who
choose to leave the U.S. or stay and engage in violence. Additional analysis indicated significant
differences in the residency status and race between ISIS and AQAM perpetrators. Finally,
results showed that, although ISIS and AQAM incidents have different configurations
concerning targets, weapons, and group size, their success rates are relatively the same. In
conclusion, there are important differences between ISIS and AQAM affiliated persons and
incidents that may merit considering them as separate entities rather than together under the
umbrella of Islamic Extremist.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism prevention has been at the forefront of
U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Today more than fifteen years after the attacks, many
Americans still consider terrorism to be the primary concern facing the United States (Pew
Research Center 2016). In the years following 9/11, the United States focused a massive amount
of resources toward its “War on Terror” to prevent another attack of similar magnitude. The
Islamic Extremist movement was of concern given al-Qaeda’s orchestration of the attacks.
Today, the movement in the United States has undergone considerable change with the
emergence of ISIS.
On the Fourth of July, 2014, a man named Abu Bakr al Baghdadi slowly climbed the steps of
the Great Mosque in the Iraqi city of Mosul. Clad in the traditional black dress of Prophet
Muhammad, Baghdadi proclaimed the renewal of an ancient Islamic caliphate and called on all
Muslims to submit to his leadership. In the months prior, Baghdadi’s organization – then known
as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)1 – mounted an offensive and taken control of large
swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. Gruesome images of the group’s violence following this
unprecedented territorial acquisition stunned the world - the group seemed to have risen from
nowhere.
Today, ISIS inspires and organizes attacks around the world, including in the United States.
Despite this, we know very little quantitatively about the group and its adherents’ place in
American terrorism. This shortage of information is reflective of a general trend in American
terrorism literature across the ideological spectrum. Terrorism as a strategy in the U.S. has
1

Though the group has gone through a number of name changes, this project will refer to the
group currently known also as “Islamic State” as ISIS.
1

evolved over the past four decades, and research indicates that there are important differences in
incident-related behaviors across ideological and organizational types of terrorist groups (Smith
2016). Terrorists motivated by differing ideologies may engage in violence in different ways.
Although it developed as an affiliate to al-Qaeda, ISIS now contends with the group for
leadership of the global Islamic Extremist movement. The two once-connected organizations
have important ideological and structural differences that led to a formal separation between the
two in 2015. These differences may justify treating ISIS and al-Qaeda and Associated
Movements (AQAM) as separate entities altogether, rather than considering them only under the
umbrella of Islamic Extremism. Recent research suggests there may be differences within
ideological categories themselves, including between ISIS and al-Qaeda related activities. Table
1 shows recent findings from the American Terrorism Study’s final report recently submitted to
the National Institute of Justice (2016) examining precursor behaviors across ideologies.
Table 1. Key Variables by Category of Terrorism
Variable

All
%

Number of Preparatory
Acts (n=344)
0-2
3-5
6+
Number of Recorded
Meetings (n=206)
0
1-3
4+
Length of Planning
Cycle (n=277)
0-20 days
21-95 days
96-285 days
286+ days

FarLeft
%

Environmental
%

FarRight
%

AQAM

ISIS

%

%

ChiSquare
p value
.000

42.7
19.5
37.8

7.1
26.2
66.7

69.7
12.4
18.0

48.8
23.6
27.6

27.9
16.4
55.7

17.2
20.7
62.1
.412

49.5
25.7
24.8

51.9
25.9
22.2

58.0
30.0
12.0

46.3
25.9
27.8

48.9
23.4
27.7

39.3
21.4
39.3

25.6
26.0
23.8
24.5

7.3
14.6
22.0
56.1

48.1
20.3
19.0
12.7

21.4
32.1
23.8
22.6

7.1
16.7
38.1
38.1

29.0
51.6
19.4
0.0

.000
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Table 1. Key Variables by Category of Terrorism (Cont.)
Variable

Number of Offenders
(n=398)
1
2-3
4+
Sophistication (n=448)
Least
Moderately
Most
Incident Failure
(n=469)
Failed
Successful

All

FarLeft

Environmental

FarRight

AQAM

ISIS

ChiSquare

%

%

%

%

%

%

p value

37.2
40.5
22.4

8.6
51.4
40.0

13.2
54.9
31.9

54.5
28.5
17.1

62.5
29.2
8.3

42.9
45.2
11.9

37.9
14.7
47.3

1.3
6.6
92.1

94.5
0.0
5.5

27.8
21.4
50.8

7.9
21.1
71.1

18.6
41.9
39.5

.000

.000

.000
42.2
57.8

23.8
76.3

22.7
77.3

41.2
58.8

75.3
24.7

75.0
25.0

The analysis found variation across group types not only in the volume of preparatory acts
committed prior to an incident, but also the type of preparatory acts, the length of the preparatory
process (planning cycle), and the number of persons participating in the incident. The results
concerning success rates across group types are also significant and indicate that AQAM and
ISIS have extremely similar proportions of success in their incidents despite their differences
across other factors.
As the threat of ISIS intensifies, it is important to understand how this relatively new terrorist
group operates in the historical context of American terrorism and whether it departs from its
ideological counterpart to better inform law enforcement practice and policy. A key part of this
may lie in understanding not only who supports ISIS but also how they go about doing so or
planning to do so.

3

In an effort to begin filling this gap, this project asks two major research questions
concerning ISIS-related activity in the United States:
1.

Are there differences between U.S. ISIS supporters who choose to support ISIS abroad
compared to those who choose to support ISIS in the United States?

2.

Are there differences between violent domestic ISIS plots and those developed by the
broader Islamic Extremist movement in the U.S., as represented by AQAM?

4

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Since this project attempts to place ISIS in some historical context, the first portion of this
chapter constitutes a general history of how the Islamic State evolved out of the global Islamic
Extremist movement and arrived at its current state. The second portion of this chapter focuses
on the structural history of terrorism in the United States and how ISIS’ global strategy fits
within that structure. The last section of the chapter includes a discussion of the limited
quantitative literature concerning ISIS and Islamic Extremist terrorism in the United States.

The Development of the Modern Islamic Extremist Movement
The modern Islamic Extremist movement began to take shape in the middle of the 20th
century in the works of an Egyptian named Sayyid Qutb (Wright 2006). His writings grew to
include two main themes: 1) the superiority of Islam as a political and social structure, and 2) the
necessity to implement this superiority by resisting western influence and its presence in the
Islamic world. Three years after World War II ended, a then middle-aged Qutb visited the United
States on scholarship. He expected the world’s hegemon to be a beacon of success and culture,
but was appalled with what he found. Qutb saw the United States as a Godless wasteland of
materialistic excess. His negative views, like those of many in the Middle East, were
compounded by the betrayal felt for American recognition of the state of Israel. Upon returning
to Egypt, Qutb wrote of the United States:
It is the case of a people who have reached the peak of growth and elevation in the
world of science and productivity, while remaining abysmally primitive in the world
of the senses, feelings, and behavior. A people who have not exceeded the most
primordial levels of existence (Qutb 1951:11).

5

Qutub argued that a social system based completely on Islam would prevent the Middle East
from suffering the same fate of barbarism. After Egypt emerged from its revolution to oust
British colonial rule, the country’s new leader, Abdel Nasser, clashed with Qutb (Wright, 2006).
Nasser, a relatively secular Arab nationalist, did not appreciate Qutb’s brand of Islamism and
calls for an Islamic vanguard. Qutb was critical of Nasser and viewed him as a western puppet
standing in the way of Islamic revolution. After being accused of complicity in an assassination
attempt on Nasser, Qutub was imprisoned. Before his execution in the late 1960s, he wrote
prolifically on the need for rejuvenation of fundamentalist Islam. In his book Milestones, Qutb
called for the complete and destruction of all existing political and social orders in favor of a
system with Islam at its center (Qutb 1964).
Though Nasser hoped that Qutb’s radical ideology would die with him, unrest in the region
facilitated the ideology’s expansion. The 1960s and 1970s saw a series of conflicts that
heightened anti-Western sentiment. Wars between Israel and Arab countries throughout both
decades were a major point of contention. The conflicts spurred conversation away from
Nasser’s brand of secularism and toward Islamic revolution, transcending even the Sunni-Shiite
divide. Violent Shiite Islamic revolution succeeded in Iran, where American involvement in
perpetuating the unpopular Shah’s reign had fostered an intense – and enduring – antiAmericanism (Goldschmidt, Jr. and Davidson 2009). Before the revolution, Iran had been
considered one of America’s strongest allies in the region, serving as what President Carter in a
1977 New Year’s speech called an “island of stability” for American interests (Goldschmidt, Jr.
and Davidson 2009:365). The United States’ strained relationship with Iran endures to this day.
In 1979, the same year as the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The
invasion served as another rallying point for Islamic revolutionary ideology, and the ensuing
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proxy war served as a refinery for the militant Islamist ideology and its future leaders (Wright
2006). One such leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was heavily influenced by Qutb’s writings and had
been organizing his own band of militants. Like Qutb, he became increasingly radicalized after a
stint in prison. Another future leader of the movement, Osama bin Laden, found purpose in
fighting alongside the mujahedeen in Afghanistan. During the war, bin Laden envisioned a force
that would champion the Islamist cause across the world and push the communists out of
Afghanistan to make way for an Islamic State as Qutb envisioned. Secretly established in 1988,
bin Laden called the organization al-Qaeda – literally translated as “the base” for the worldwide
Islamist movement (Miller 2012). Over the next two decades, al-Qaeda would become just that.
Ten years after invading, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. Within two years, the
Soviet Union itself fell. Bin Laden considered it a massive victory for the mujahedeen and the
Islamist movement as a whole (Wright 2006). After the Soviet-Afghan war, bin Laden returned
to his business practices but did not completely disengage from the movement. Though the
United States supported the effort to push its Cold War rival out of Afghanistan, its support of
Israel and continued military presence – particularly in Saudi Arabia – angered bin Laden. With
the Soviet Union vanquished, the United States “was the only power capable of blocking the
restoration of the ancient Islamic caliphate, and it would have to be confronted and defeated”
(Wright 2006:199). After being pushed out of his native Saudi Arabia under political pressure,
bin Laden spent the next seven years traveling across the Middle East and parts of Africa,
funding various al-Qaeda training camps.
In 1993, Ramzi Yousef, a product of one such training camp in Afghanistan, brought
violence on behalf of al-Qaeda to U.S. soil. He drove an explosive-laden truck into the parking
garage under the World Trade Center in New York City in an attempt to bring the towers and
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subsequently the U.S. economy down. Though the attack did not destroy the financial system, it
resulted in six deaths and brought awareness of al-Qaeda to Americans. Later that same year, a
newspaper article detailed bin Laden’s role as a businessman “putting his army on the road to
peace” (Fisk 1993). In the article, bin Laden scoffed at allegations of ongoing involvement in the
violent Islamist movement. After a combination of business stagnation, continued American
presence in Saudi Arabia, and an increasingly strained relationship with his country and family,
bin Laden decided to leave his business ventures behind and once again take up the mantel of
militant (Wright 2006).
In 1993, he returned to Afghanistan, his commitment to the movement renewed. He issued a
fatwa entitled “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy
Places” and met with Ramzi Yousef’s uncle. The two disussed his nephew’s previous World
Trade Center attack and ideas for future plots, some involving hijacking aircraft. Two years after
the first fatwa, bin Laden issued a second. He declared it to be the duty of all Muslims to kill
Americans wherever and however they could to help with the war against the west. By this point,
Zawahiri’s group (al-Jihad) had joined with al-Qaeda, and the movement became increasingly
violent (Miller 2012).
The group directed several prominent attacks, including the bombings of US embassies and
the USS Cole in 1998. Under bin Laden and Zawahiri’s leadership, al-Qaeda became the face of
the Islamic Extremist movement in the United States and around the globe. Despite the increased
violence, Americans were not fully aware of the threat until the morning of September 11, 2001
(Stern, 2003). After perpetrating the deadliest terrorist attack in U.S. history, al-Qaeda served as
a banner for other Islamist groups to organize under. From the landscape of international turmoil
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following 9/11, ISIS emerged in Iraq as one of many al-Qaeda affiliates, set on accomplishing
the task Sayyid Qutb called for decades earlier: the creation of an Islamic State.

The Emergence of ISIS
As with al-Qaeda, a veteran of the Soviet-Afghan war laid the foundations for ISIS (Bunzel
2015). Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi, a Jordanian, emerged from the conflict dedicated to the cause of
violent Islamism. After being released from a prison stint in 1999, Zarqawi traversed between alQaeda training camps. When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, Zarqawi left for
Iraq. Once there, he founded a group called the Jama’t al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad (the Group of
Monotheism and Jihad). Zarqawi’s group, as described by Bunzel (2015) consisted of two main
ideological tenets: 1) A desire to see the restoration of the Islamic caliphate; and 2) A hatred of
the Shiite sect of Islam. The divide between Sunni and Shiite Muslims dates back to the years
following Prophet Muhammad’s death. After Prophet died without leaving explicit plans for a
successor as caliph. As head of the faith, the caliph unites all Muslims under Islam and presides
over a geographic area, or caliphate. In extremely simple terms, Muahmmad’s followers
disagreed on whether his successor should be a blood relative or nominated companion (Brown
2009). After four caliphs succeeded him, the disagreement resulted in the Shiite and Sunni
factions.
Today, the vast majority of Muslims are Sunni. Iraq, however, is a majority Shiite country.
After the U.S. invasion in 2003, Iraq proved to be the ideal place to turn ideology into action
(Stern 2015). Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party had favored the country’s Sunni minority. When
he was deposed by the United States, the ensuing democratic government reflected the Shiite
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majority. For ISIS’ predecessor, this was wholly unacceptable, as Zarqawi and his followers
viewed Shiite Muslims as apostates and threats to true Islam.
Under ISIS’ strict ideology, apostasy merits a death sentence. Essentially, killing Shiites –
and therefore killing apostates – is not killing fellow Muslims; it is cleansing the faith of a
dangerous idolatry and protecting the true form of Islam. Justification for this portion of their
ideology comes from its interpretation of the Islamic concept of jihad. Essentially meaning
struggle, jihad generally exists in two forms: inner and outer. Inner jihad, the predominant form
of jihad, refers to the inner struggle within every Muslim to grow in their faith and relationship
with Allah. Outer jihad refers to physical struggle for the faith and is justified in a defensive
context when the faith or its followers are attacked, and is generally the way al-Qaeda views
jihad and justifies its violence (Goldschmidt, Jr. and Davidson 2009). ISIS, on the other hand,
subscribes to a brand of jihad advocated for by Sayyid Qutb. He argued that establishing the
caliphate requires another form of outer jihad: offensive (Wright 2006; Bunzel 2015). In this
form, physical jihad justifies attacks against those who have not outwardly attacked Islam but
represent a threat to it.
This ideological stance combined with political upheaval in Iraq proved well matched.
Pushed out of government by the United States, scores of former Ba’athists suddenly found
themselves without work or power. They flocked to Zarqawi’s organization (then known as alQaeda in Iraq (AQI2)), taking key leadership posts and becoming integral in the group’s military,
intelligence, and finance ministries (Coles and Parker 2015). Their involvement with ISIS has
been a key factor in the group’s relative success, bringing a degree of government experience to
the caliphate (Stern 2015).
2

Zarqawi pledged fealty to Osama bin Laden in 2004; the group was subsequently referred to as
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
10

The group’s violence against Shiites and civilians in Iraq, however, proved to be a point of
separation between it and al-Qaeda central. In a 2005 letter, Zawahiri asked Zarqawi to limit the
group’s violence against civilians and reduce its “scenes of slaughter.” (Stern 2015:22) When
Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike a year later, AQI was left loosely organized. In the midst of
tension between the groups, Bin Laden eulogized the late leader and emphasized their shared
goal of establishing an Iraqi caliphate (Bunzel 2015). Afterward, without consulting al-Qaeda
central, AQI assimilated other Iraqi groups. The new coalition announced it was establishing the
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and changed its name accordingly.
This original caliphate, however, proved ineffectual. The absence of well-organized
leadership, a limited audience, and lack of support from al-Qaeda leadership relegated the
caliphate to a “paper state” (Bunzel 2015). When Abu Bakr al Baghdadi assumed leadership of
the organization, ISI appeared to be faltering and near dissolution. His leadership would prove to
be transformative (Stern 2015). He set to work rebuilding the organization and heavily recruiting
former Ba’athists al al-Qaeda affiliate groups. When neighboring Syria was thrust into civil war,
Baghdadi sensed an opportunity and began recruiting from the array of violent Islamist groups
there. The group formally changed its name to “Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham” (ISIS) to
reflect its new area of influence. This expansion into Syria further shook ISIS’ relationship with
al-Qaeda. Reconciliatory efforts failed, and al-Qaeda officially denounced ISIS as a separate
entity from al-Qaeda on February 2, 2014.
Four months after the formal separation, ISIS moved through areas of Iraq and Syria,
capturing territory in unprecedented fashion. By the end of June 2014, Baghdadi stood
triumphantly in the city of Mosul and gave a symbolism-laden speech announcing the restoration
of the ancient Muslim caliphate (Warrick 2016). He declared himself caliph and demanded
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allegiance from Muslims around the world. Its location along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the
most population dense areas due to their proximity to water, meant that the caliphate contained
roughly up to ten million people (BBC 2016). Today, the caliphate and its major cities are the
targets of airstrikes by a U.S. led coalition of nations. The airstrikes have reduced the size of the
caliphate and severely impacted ISIS’ ability to move resources and people throughout its
territory (Warrick 2016).
A final, emblematic name change accompanied the announcement of the caliphate; the group
would now be known as “the Islamic State” – reinforcing the group’s assertion that its influence
known no traditional borders, and has no geographic limitations. In Islam, Muslims are
considered united by the faith with the concept of the ummah – the collective body of Islam
(Brown 2009). When al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself caliph, he was not referring only to the
people inhabiting the existing caliphate, but the entire body of Islam. Any potential threat to the
faith from around the world constitutes an enemy and must be eliminated. With a vast swath of
targets, including the United States, ISIS has reinvigorated the global Islamic Extremist
movement.

The Strategic Evolution of American Terrorism
To understand ISIS in the context of U.S. terrorism, it is important to first look at how
terrorism in the United States developed over time. The structure of American terrorist
movements evolved across decades and ideologies because of the necessity to extend the
longevity of each movement. Smith, Shields, and Damphousse (2013) describe three general
strategies used to perpetrate terrorism in the United States over the last fifty years: the rural
revolutionary model, the cellular model, and the uncoordinated violence model.
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Fidel Castro’s Cuban Revolution best exemplified the Rural Revolutionary Model (RRM).
Intended to facilitate full government overthrows, the RRM has four distinct components: 1)
Capturing and holding terrain; 2) A hierarchical military structure; 3) The creation of “fixed
compounds” to aid in land-taking; and 4) An extended support system. Having been successful
in Cuba, Castro attempted to export the strategy to other revolutionaries around the world who
were ultimately unsuccessful in its implementation. Despite Castro’s success, the RRM’s fixed
structure made organizations that utilized it into easy targets for intelligence and law
enforcement agencies.
In the United States, implementing the RRM proved difficult. The far-right attempted to use
the strategy but was overwhelmingly unsuccessful. During the movement’s flourish in the 1980s,
far-right groups established fixed rural compounds intended to serve as bases for a coming war
with the U.S. government. The groups intended to capture terrain and eventually draw new state
boundaries beyond government jurisdiction. The isolation and well-defined structure of the
groups made interdiction relatively easy. By the end of the 1980s, law enforcement had brought
charges against (though not convicted) nearly every leader of the far-right movement.
Far-left groups in the United States saw the failure of international far-left application of the
Rural Revolutionary Model, such as Che Guevera in Bolivia. With the prospect of taking and
holding land a near impossibility in the United States, a new strategy developed. The Cellular
Model (CM), used predominantly by far-left groups in the U.S., attempts to do away with much
of the fixed structure that makes the RRM so easily penetrated. In the CM, group structure is far
less centralized and loosely coordinated cells engage in attacks on the movement’s behalf. While
a handful of group members may know bits and pieces of the group’s overall structure, it is more
difficult to uncover the web of leadership and adherence in the movement.
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The strategy fit well in urban areas where the far-left was most present, aided by books
written specifically for the strategy, such as The Anarchist Cookbook and The Minimanual of the
Urban Guerilla. While the American far-left eventually sank into obscurity, other ideologies
have recently utilized the CM. When al-Qaeda directed the September 11th attacks, it utilized the
CM to put a loosely connected group in the United States to plan and perpetrate the incidents.
While the CM has advantages over the RRM, a third model of terrorism does away with
within-movement connections altogether. The Uncoordinated Violence Model (UVM) relies on a
completely decentralized structure. Incidents are planned and executed without explicit direction
from a parent group or cell. This, theoretically, makes interdiction extremely difficult. Usage of
this strategy in the United States has spanned ideologies and is currently the major concern of
law enforcement (Smith, Shields, and Damphousse 2013).
After the far-right’s failure in the 1980s, the movement’s leaders called for a shift in tactics
to a strategy of “leaderless resistance.” In 1995, Timothy McVeigh bombed the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City in perhaps the most famous employ of the UVM, often referred to
today as a “lone wolf” attack. Al-Qaeda’s fatwas directed this same sort of independent action.
The ease of spreading propaganda and directives for followers to engage in the UVM increased
with the advent of the Internet. Even in the internet’s early days, Environmental groups used it to
post “direct actions” and log incidents independently perpetrated by the movement’s adherents.

ISIS’ Hybrid Strategy
The globalism of the Islamic State’s ideology has resulted in a unique hybrid strategy unseen
in the Islamic Extremist movement to date. Across the three strategies – rural revolutionary,
cellular/group, and uncoordinated violence – U.S. violent support of ISIS filters generally into
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two camps: foreign fighters and domestic supporters. The foreign fighters are those individuals
who leave the United States to engage in the group’s violent Rural Revolutionary strategy in the
caliphate. Domestic supporters remain in the United States and choose to either engage in
violence by plotting an incident (domestic plotters) or supporting the group in some other way,
such as recruiting, running propaganda sites, or sending resources (domestic non-plotters). Data
suggests that the majority of ISIS supporters elect for the foreign fighter option. In an analysis of
102 ISIS-related indictees in the United States, 46 percent attempted to travel or fight alongside
ISIS forces internationally, while 29 percent chose to plot attacks on U.S. soil rather than engage
in violence abroad (Vidino and Hughes 2015).
Although ISIS’ most direct application of the Rural Revolutionary model exists in its
territorial acquisitions in Iraq and Syria, the strategy impacts the United States as well. To secure
the resources necessary to maintain its territory, ISIS utilizes international support, a military
hierarchical structure, and fixed
compounds as centers of operation in
keeping with the other tenets of the
Rural Revolutionary Strategy (Stern
2015). Currently, this strategy’s
implementation in the United States
Figure 1. Source: Hosken, Andrew. Empire of Fear:
Inside the Islamic State. 2015.

has been restricted to an international
support highway that provides

fighters and resources to maintain the caliphate. Estimates of how many fighters have left the
United States vary widely. In 2014, FBI director James Comey suggested “a few dozen” persons
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in the United States had contact with ISIS, while other estimates put the number in the hundreds
(Williams 2014).
While establishing a caliphate in the United States is not one of ISIS’ immediate goals, future
plans do include an expansion of the rural revolutionary strategy to the west. Its current priority
is opposition to local threats to the security of the caliphate. ISIS affiliates have released maps
describing the first steps in this expansion process (see Figure 1) with the eventual goal of
dominating the world and bringing all Muslims under the fold of the caliphate. The plan focuses
primarily on expanding toward the caliphate’s immediate geographic neighbors, including parts
of Europe. The ultimate goal is to unite all Muslims under central Islamic rule and eliminate all
threats to the faith, including western people and culture. The purest versions of society and the
caliphate cannot exist simultaneously with the west, and the United States would eventually be
brought into the fold of the caliphate.
ISIS has made it a point to call on individuals in countries around the world to attack
unbelievers and apostates wherever they find them (Warrick 2016). As previously discussed, the
major difference between these two strategies is the degree to which the perpetrator(s) had
outside help. While attacks perpetrated under the cellular structure are facilitated or directed by
ISIS itself, attacks inspired by ISIS - without a formal connection to the group - fall under the
Uncoordinated Violence Model.
The available literature suggests that the latter is ISIS’ predominant strategy in the United
States, but not necessarily in the entirety of the west. Cellular (ISIS directed) attacks comprise
roughly 40 percent of ISIS incidents in the west (Homeland Security 2016). This is largely due to
its geographic proximity to the caliphate and countries that ISIS is known to use as resource
highways. Turkey has served an important function for the group as a means of transporting
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fighters and plots internationally. The possibility of ISIS fighters traveling to the continent with
Syrian refugees has also fueled concerns of developing ISIS cells.
France has been particularly affected by ISIS’ cellular strategy. On November 13, 2015,
several teams of ISIS supporters coordinated attacks throughout Paris. Armed with automatic
weapons and explosives, the attackers killed 130 victims and injured hundreds more. ISIS
claimed responsibility for the attacks, and a subsequent investigation revealed ISIS had
organized the attacks from within France with the help of Fabian Claine, a known ISIS member
and French national.
Detecting ISIS directed plots in the United States are decidedly more difficult. The same year
as the Paris attacks, three men were arrested in a plot to behead anti-Islam activist Pamela Geller,
who had organized a “Draw Muhammad” conference in Dallas, Texas. The three men were
receiving direction and instruction from an ISIS member overseas through phone and Internet
communications. The ISIS representative selected the target and instructed the perpetrators to
obtain knives and use caution to avoid detection. Law enforcement had been surveilling the cell
and foiled the incident after arresting one of the perpetrators as he attempted to attack police
officers.
Almost the entirety of ISIS attacks in the United States have been inspired by, rather than
directed by, ISIS. In San Bernardino, California, husband and wife Syed Rizwan Farook and
Tashfeen Malik stormed Farook’s holiday office party armed with homemade pipe bombs and
assault rifles purchased by a friend. They killed 14 people and injured 24 more before both dying
in a shootout with police. After the attack, the FBI called it an act of “homegrown terrorism”
without a connection to ISIS, but ISIS claimed responsibility for inspiring the attack. In Orlando,
Florida, 29-year old Omar Mateen professed his support of ISIS while shooting 49 people in a
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nightclub in the deadliest terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11. Mateen appears to have
acted alone, radicalizing after viewing ISIS propaganda online, staking out potential targets, and
legally purchasing a firearm in the months leading up to the attack.
As the caliphate continues to lose territory and resources, intelligence officials have
expressed fears that waves of former ISIS fighters returning to their respective countries will
spur a shift of ISIS’ still vast resources from the Rural Revolutionary strategy toward increasing
attacks abroad. FBI director James Comey called this wave a “terrorist diaspora… like we’ve
never seen before” with numbers potentially reaching into the thousands (Gerstein and Scholtes
2016). This suggests that the threat of violence in western countries, including the United States,
could intensify and shift toward a more centrally directed, cellular strategy rather than an
uncoordinated strategy.
With this in mind, it is increasingly important to learn about ISIS attacks in the United States.
Should their strategy begin to shift, demographic and incident data may prove invaluable to U.S.
intelligence and law enforcement agencies in determining who tends to become involved with
which strategy. The existing empirical literature on ISIS gives a limited view of who ISIS’
supporters in the United States are and how they engage in violence, but as the movement
continuously evolves, it is necessary to continue to examine each characteristic.

Empirical Data Concerning ISIS in the United States
Existing quantitative data on ISIS and al-Qaeda in the United States is extremely limited.
This section contains a summary of the literature available to facilitate the development of
hypotheses relating to demographic and incident comparisons.
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Demographics and Prevalence of Support Types
Little is known about the demographics of the ISIS membership. Exisiting literature
concerning demographics of the movement has utilized court records as source materials and
mostly evaluated ISIS supporters as one broad group. While findings across studies are generally
consistent, they are not very detailed. These analysis have indicated that, at least in the United
States, ISIS appears to be attracting a relatively young group of followers. The average age of
ISIS recruits in the United States is approximately 26 to 27 years old across most studies, with
ages ranging from 15 to 47 years (U.S. House Homeland Security Committee Majority Staff
Report, 2016; Vidino and Hughes 2015; Greenburg 2016; Gorka and Gorka 2015). This age
range indicates ISIS recruits are considerably younger, on average, than other American
terrorists, including al-Qaeda affiliated individuals. While AQAM individuals were also fairly
young compared to other terrorists, their average age was 30 years, with a range from 19 to 63
years (Simcox and Dyer 2013). With regard to ISIS support strategy, the available data does not
contain much detail on demographic differences between those who choose to join the caliphate
and those who choose to plan an incident in the United States.
Additionally, research indicates that both ISIS supporters and AQAM supporters are
generally male, with roughly 90 percent and 95 percent, respectively (Greenburg 2016; Vidino
and Hughes 2015; Threat Knowledge Group 2015; Simcox and Dyer 2013). A preponderance of
male involvement is historically consistent with American terrorism overall, though the extent to
which males outnumber females does tend to vary somewhat across ideologies. Finally, in each
analysis the individuals were predominantly U.S. citizens or legal residents: somewhere between
75-79 percent overall. One analysis did differentiate between citizenship across domestic plotters
and foreign fighters, and found that both consist of roughly 86 percent U.S. born individuals
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(Greenburg 2016). By contrast, U.S. born perpetrators comprise approximately 54 percent of
AQAM-related individuals (Simcox and Dyer 2013).
The data generally indicate that most ISIS supporters choose the foreign fighter rather than
domestic plotter approach. An analysis from George Washington University’s Program on
Extremism studied 102 ISIS-related individuals indicted in the United States and found that,
while 46 percent attempted to travel to fight alongside ISIS forces, 29 percent plotted attacks on
U.S. soil (Vidino and Hughes 2015). A 2015 analysis from the Threat Knowledge Group
reported similar findings – 30 percent of U.S. ISIS supporters plotting attacks on U.S. soil
compared to 52 percent attempting to travel overseas.
Based on the existing literature regarding demographic information, I tested the following
hypotheses concerning ISIS persons across support types3 and in comparison to AQAMaffiliated individuals:
H1: Domestic plotters are expected to be younger, on average, compared to foreign fighters.
H2: There will be no significant difference in the resident status across support types.
H3: There will be no significant difference in gender across the support types.
H4: ISIS perpetrators are expected to be younger, on average, compared to AQAM
perpetrators.
H4: A higher proportion of ISIS perpetrators are expected to be U.S. born citizens compared
to AQAM perpetrators.
H5: ISIS perpetrators will have a higher percentage of female involvement compared to
AQAM perpetrators.

3

Support types refer to foreign fighters, domestic plotters, and domestic non-plotters.
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Incident Characteristics
Some of the literature also explores incident characteristics. One study examined 101 ISIS plots
against the west as a whole through 2015 and 2016 and found that ISIS’ incidents success rates,
destructiveness, and degree of direct-involvement in plots has increased. Of those 101 plots, 41
were directed against the United States with most plots pursuing civilian targets (Homeland
Security 2016). By contrast, al-Qaeda’s primary target-type is military-related (Gruenewald et al.
2014).
One source included information about weapon type, and reports that ISIS plotters prefer
firearms as the most common weapon, followed by explosives (Greenburg 2016). An analysis by
the START research center in 2014 indicated that, for al-Qaeda, the opposite was true: their
plotters favored the usage of explosives first and firearms second. Differing weapon types can
have a variety of implications on the feasibility, destructiveness, and preparatory activity
required to commit the incident. Weapon accessibility is hotly debated in the United States
currently and additional data concerning weapons preferences could assist legal policy
development as well as law enforcement practices.
The hypotheses tested are based partially on the literature concerning weapon and target
types, but also the NIJ Sequencing report (Smith 2016) that suggested variation across terrorism
categories regarding plan cycle, weapon types (sophistication), success rates, and group size. For
the current project, the following hypotheses concerning ISIS and AQAM incidents were tested:
H6: ISIS incidents will be less successful compared to AQAM incidents.
H7: ISIS incidents will have, on average, shorter planning cycles compared to AQAM
incidents.
H8: Weapon type will vary significantly between ISIS and AQAM incidents, with ISIS
incidents including a higher proportion of firearms than explosives.
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H9: Target type will vary significantly between AQAM and ISIS incidents, with ISIS
incidents including a higher proportion of civilian targets than military targets.
The literature indicates that there are differences in both the types of persons and types of
plots associated with ISIS and AQAM in the United States and around the world. These
hypotheses aim to test those basic differences and suggest that the two groups, though similar in
roots, manifest the ideology of Islamic Extremism in significantly different ways. The variables,
source material, and methodology of the current study are detailed in the following section.
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CHAPTER THREE
DATA AND METHODS
The American Terrorism Study
This project utilizes data from the American Terrorism Study (ATS), housed in the
University of Arkansas Terrorism Research Center. An open-source relational database, the ATS
contains data extracted from federal terrorism-related court cases obtained through the online
Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system. These documents are supplemented
by media sources. Though the Federal Bureau of Investigation initially selected cases for
inclusion in the ATS, terrorism cases are now identified mainly through the Executive Office of
United States Attorneys (EOUSA) web site and media reports. When including a case in the
database, the ATS endeavors to remain in keeping with the following FBI definition of terrorism:
“The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives.”
Information from these court case and media documents is coded into nearly 500 variables,
split into two main forms: court case coding and incident coding. The legal portion of the
database considers the terrorism-related cases from a legal standpoint. This includes data such as
the charges filed in an indictment, the result of each count (guilty plea, jury conviction, acquittal,
etc.), and the type of defense employed by the defense. The incident portion of the database
considers the contents of the court documents from a geospatial and temporal perspective.
Terrorism incidents and incident related behaviors, referred to as antecedents, are extracted
from the documents. To be included as an incident in the ATS database, a perpetrator must have
taken at least one preparatory step toward the completion of an incident. The locations of

23

antecedent activities are geographically coded, and also, to the extent possible, date-stamped.
Incident-level coding also includes data concerning the type of weapon used or intended to be
used in the attack. This project utilizes variables from both the incident portion of the database
and the court case portion of the database.

Measurement
This section details the variables analyzed from the ATS and their operationalization, as well
as a brief description of the types of analyses utilized.
Table 2: Variables in Analysis
Person Variables

Incident Variables

Gender

Plan Cycle

Age at Arrest

Weapon Type

Race

Number of Offenders

Resident Status
Support Type

Success
Target Type

To evaluate the hypotheses associated with research question one, I utilized the following
variables: support type, resident status, race, gender, and age at arrest. To evaluate my
hypotheses associated with research question one, I utilized the following variables: support
type, resident status, race, gender, and age at arrest. Support type is a categorical variable that
designates ISIS-affiliated individuals as 0=Domestic Plotters, 1=Foreign Fighters, and
2=Domestic Non-Plotter/Other. Domestic plotters are individuals who plan to perpetrate an
incident or attack on U.S. soil. Foreign fighters refer to individuals who opt – either by deed or
by intent - to leave the country and travel overseas to support ISIS. Domestic Non-Plotters are
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other individuals who neither plan an attack nor plan/attempt to travel overseas. These
individuals support ISIS in nonviolent ways, such as recruiting online or sending money.
Resident Status is also a categorical variable that codes the individual’s U.S. residency as
0=U.S. born citizen, 1=Naturalized citizen, 2=Legal resident, 3=Illegal resident. This variable is
coded at the time of the individual’s indictment or at the time of the incident (or their death, if
applicable.) Race is separated into three categories: 0=White, 1=Black/African American,
2=Other. White is considered a person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe,
the Middle East, or North Africa. It also includes people who indicate their race as “White” or
report entries such as Irish, German, Italian, Lebanese, Near Easterner, Arab, or Polish. The
“Other” category includes Asian individuals and those coded originally as “Some Other Race”.
Gender is dichotomized as 0=male or 1=female, and Age at Arrest codes the age, in years, of the
individual upon arrest. In situations where there was no arrest date (either the individual died or
became a fugitive and was not arrested), I supplemented the age at death in the incident or at the
age of indictment.
Analysis of the hypotheses associated with research question two included person variables
coded in the same fashion as previously described (resident status, gender, race, and age at
arrest) and incident level variables: plan cycle, weapon type, target type, number of offenders,
and success. Plan Cycle is a continuous variable that codes the length in days between the first
preparatory activity associated with the incident and the date of the incident. If the incident did
not occur, the date it was intended to occur will be coded. In cases where an incident date cannot
be found or reasonably approximated, the variable is coded using the first preparatory activity
and the indictment date. For the purposes of analysis, I created a new variable along quartiles of
the Plan Cycle, splitting it into 0=0-2 months, 1=2-4 months, 2=4 months to 1 year, and 3=more
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than 1 year. Weapon Type codes the most destructive type of weapon used or intended to be used
in the incident as (from most destructive to least) 0=Explosives, 1=Firearms, 2=Other. The
“Other” category is a collapsed category that consists of 12 incidents that utilized a “melee”
weapon, 6 incidents coded as “other unspecified weapons”, and one incident involving an
“incendiary weapon.”
Target Type characterizes the type of target attacked or intended to be attacked during the
incident as 0=Military, 1=Government, 2=Civilian, 3=Business/Financial, 4=Transportation, or
5=Other. The “Other” category includes 3 incidents with Educational targets, 7 religious, and 16
coded as other unspecified target types. Number of Offenders is a continuous variable that
captures the number of perpetrators involved in the conspiracy. This can include terrorist
offenders themselves but also confidential informants or undercover agents if the terrorist
offender perceived that individual to be a part of the planning/preparatory group. Finally,
Success codes whether the attack was 0=Unsuccessful (incident prevent or failed to occur due to
plot cancellation, complete device failure, or human intervention) or 1=Successful (all weapons
were delivered to the intended target and caused an observable amount of damage). Attacks that
are partially successful (i.e. the incident occurred on the intended target but weapons failed to
detonate or discharge as initially intended) are included in the successful category. Incidents and
persons were both dichotomized as either 0=AQAM or 1=ISIS. Individuals are coded as ISIS if
court or media documents specifically indicated they had pledged fealty to or somehow
supported the group, but as AQAM if there was no explicit affiliation. Simply viewing ISIS
propaganda in search history or discussing the group does not qualify an individual to be coded
as ISIS-affiliated, but reposting and creating propaganda explicitly supporting the group does.
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Methods of Analysis
The first analysis conducted for research question 1 included chi square analyses of the
demographic variables with support type as the independent variable. I also performed
conjunctive analysis of case configurations utilizing the syntax and methodology described by
Miethe, Hart, and Regoeczi (2008) to examine differences across ISIS individuals’ support type.
Conjunctive analysis (CACC) examines the most common case configurations in a dataset and
generates an average value for a specified output variable. Commonly used for risk factor
analysis, conjunctive analysis allows one to essentially examine a perfect storm of factors and
their average outcome.
For example, if the model is generating the most common sets of risk factors for an armed
assault from a dataset containing situational variables, conjunctive analysis groups cases together
with the same configuration of factors (e.g. time of day, race of victim, race of perpetrator, etc.)
and generates an average for a given output variable. In this case, if the average output variable
(say, where 0=unarmed assault and 1=armed assault) value was .75, this would indicate that 75%
of situations with that set of factors resulted in an armed assault. For this project, conjunctive
analysis is used to predict ISIS support type (domestic plotter, foreign fighter, or domestic nonplotter) based on the most common configurations of demographic factors. In order to ensure the
output variable (support type) was dichotomous, this first CACC examines support type as either
foreign or domestic – essentially, whether or not individuals chose to stay in the United States
(0) or wanted to leave (1). The second CACC model concerning support type considers those
who chose to stay in the United States and separates them into two groups, domestic non-plotters
(0) and domestic plotters (1). In addition, unless otherwise indicated, only configurations with
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more than 5 cases were included in the CACC tables in keeping with previous research standards
recommended when sample size is less than 1,000 (Hart 2014).
As with the hypotheses concerning research question one, the analysis associated with
research question two includes chi square statistics, first with perpetrators and then with
incidents. Both analyses utilized affiliation – AQAM versus ISIS – as the independent variable.
The conjunctive analysis concerning incidents predicts success rates based on incident
configurations.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS
This first portion of this chapter includes descriptive statistics of the dataset. The second
section contains the results of the chi-square and conjunctive analyses, beginning with the
analysis concerning variation across support types, followed by AQAM-ISIS analyses.

Descriptive Statistics
For this analysis, the ATS contains 1,428 federal “terrorism-related” court cases involving
nearly 2,000 persons. Of the persons in the database, 836 individuals are linked to either AQAM
or ISIS. To be linked to one of these ideological categories, the person must have either been
indicted in a court case designated as being linked to AQAM or ISIS or have been involved in an
incident designated as linked to AQAM or ISIS. Since this project is concerned specifically with
U.S. Islamic Extremists, I applied a citizenship control to ensure that only U.S. supporters of the
group were included in the analysis. Any non-U.S. citizen with a resident status of “Not
Applicable” was excluded from all analysis, as it indicates that the individual was not in the
United States prior to or upon being indicted. Individuals who do not have residential status
coded were eliminated from the data set, further bringing the total eligible person sample size
down to 263 AQAM-affiliated persons and 135 ISIS-affiliated persons (398 individuals total).
To examine whether or not the lack of coding made the sample less representative, I conducted
chi square analyses of both the residential-limited data set and the non-limited dataset, and found
no significant differences across demographics.
From here, since this project focuses only on AQAM-affiliated persons who participated in
the planning and/or carrying out of an incident (and were either indicted for their participation or
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died during the attack), I eliminated AQAM individuals not linked to an incident, bringing the
number of AQAM persons included in the analysis to 69. The ISIS sample remained 135 to
enable comparison across support type, which came to 47 domestic plotters, 52 foreign fighters,
and 36 domestic non-plotters. In total, the data set contains 204 individual persons.

Resident Status

Table 3: Characteristics of ISIS Persons
N
%
U.S. Born
83
62.4
Naturalized
20
15.0
Legal Resident
26
19.5
Illegal Resident
4
3.0
Total
133
100.0

Gender

Male
Female
Total

118
16
134

88.1
11.9
100.0

Race

White
Black
Other
Total

73
54
6
133

54.9
40.6
4.5
100.0

Support Type

Domestic Plotter
Foreign Fighter
Domestic Non-Plotter
Total

48
52
35
135

35.6
38.5
25.9
100.0

Age

Overall
Domestic Plotter
Foreign Fighter
Domestic Non-Plotter

Mean
27.0
26.2
25.7
30.1

Median
25.0
25.5
21.5
29.0

Max
55
45
52
55

Min
15
15
18
16

The analysis across ISIS support types consists of a total of 135 individuals, fairly evenly
distributed into Domestic Plotters (35.6 percent), Foreign Fighters (38.5 percent), and Domestic
Non-Plotters (25.9 percent). Most of the ISIS individuals are U.S. born citizens (62.4 percent),
with very few (3.0 percent) having illegal residency status. The sample is principally male (88.1
percent) and white (54.9), as would be expected. Finally, the average age overall is consistent
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between domestic plotters and foreign fighters (26.2 years and 25.7 years, respectively), but a
little higher for domestic non-plotters (30.1 years).

Affiliation

Table 4: Characteristics of AQAM-ISIS Perpetrators
N
%
AQAM
69
59.0
ISIS
48
41.0
Total
117
100.0

Resident Status

US Born
Naturalized
Legal Resident
Illegal Resident
Total

55
17
23
13
108

50.9
15.7
21.3
12.0
100.0

Gender

Male
Female
Total

111
6
117

94.9
5.1
100.0

Race

White
Black
Other
Total

82
28
4
114

71.9
24.6
3.5
100.0

Age

Overall
ISIS
AQAM

Mean
28.3
26.2
29.8

Median
26.0
25.5
26.0

Min
15
15
19

Max
66
45
66

Table 4 contains summary descriptive statistics of the ISIS-AQAM perpetrator dataset. Of
the 117 perpetrators analyzed for this project, 69 (59.0 percent) are AQAM-affiliated and 48 (41
percent) are ISIS affiliated. The sample overall is generally U.S. Born (50.9 percent), with 12
percent possessing illegal U.S. residency. The perpetrator sample is comprised primarily of
males (94.9 percent) with an average overall age of 28.3 years. ISIS perpetrators are, on average,
younger than AQAM perpetrators in the data set, 26.2 years to 29.8 years, respectively.
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Table 5: Characteristics of Incidents
Affiliation

AQAM
ISIS
Total

N
94
52
146

%
64.4
35.6
100.0

Weapon Type

Explosives
Firearms
Other
Total

82
38
19
139

59.0
27.3
13.7
100.0

Target Type

Military
Government
Civilian
Business/Financial
Transportation
Other
Total

31
26
21
18
17
26
139

22.3
18.7
15.1
12.9
12.2
18.7
100.0

Num. Offenders

1
2-3
4+
Total

67
48
28
143

46.9
33.6
19.6
100.0

Success

Unsuccessful
Successful
Total

112
34
146

76.7
23.3
100.0

Plan Cycle

Mean
201.0
65.8
304.8

Overall
ISIS
AQAM

Median
113.0
56.0
285.0

Min
2.0
2.0
11.0

Max
1159.0
267.0
1159.0

Lastly, in addition to persons data, this project also includes analysis of AQAM and ISIS
incidents in the United States. While the ATS database contained 570 U.S. incidents at the time
of this analysis, 146 of them are designated as AQAM or ISIS affiliated. A measure of success
was available for each of these incidents, therefore all 146 are included in the analysis. Table 5
contains descriptives of the incident data, which consists mainly of AQAM incidents (64.4
percent). Overall, the bulk of the incidents in the dataset involve explosives, military targets, and
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small groups. Roughly one quarter (23.3 percent) of the incidents are coded as having achieved
some level of success. We can also see preliminary differences between AQAM and ISIS
incidents with regard to the planning cycle, with those of the AQAM incidents being, on average,
longer than the ISIS incidents.
It is important to note that the values listed in Table 5 concerning the plan cycle do not
include outliers of plan cycles exceeding 1200 days. The plots considered outliers are 9/11 plots
with a plan cycle of 1,845 days and incidents planned by a woman named Aafia Siddiqui. She
had been involved in planning multiple U.S. incidents but disappeared for a number of years
before resurfacing with a copy of the plans in hand, making the plan cycle for those incidents
2,214 days. The values including the outlier plan cycles indicate an overall average plan cycle of
419 days, with a minimum of 2 days and a maximum of 2,214 days and a median of 134.5 days.
The average for AQAM incidents with these outlier plan cycles is 636.8 days, with a minimum
of 11 days and a maximum of 2,214 days and a median of 301 days.

Results I: Analysis Across ISIS Support Types
As shown in Table 6, hypotheses one through three are generally supported by the data. As
originally hypothesized, resident status does not appear to vary significantly across support
types. Regardless of support type, roughly between one half and two thirds of ISIS supporters are
U.S. born, with very few having illegal residency status.

Resident Status
n=133

Table 6: ISIS Support Type Analysis
Domestic
Foreign
Domestic
Plotters
Fighters
Non-Plotters
U.S. Born
68.8
65.4
48.5
Naturalized
14.6
15.4
15.2
Legal Resident
14.6
17.3
30.3
Illegal Resident
2.1
1.9
6.1
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Sig.

X2

.485

5.47

Gender
n=134

Table 6: ISIS Support Type Analysis (Cont.)
% Domestic
% Foreign
% Domestic
Plotters
Fighters
Non-Plotters
Male
93.8
94.2
70.6
Female
6.3
5.8
29.4

Race
n=133

White
Non-white

57.4
42.6

46.2
53.8

64.7
35.3

.218

3.05

Age
n=134

Under 21
21 - 25
26-30
Over 30

20.8
29.2
31.3
18.8

40.4
28.8
7.7
23.1

14.7
20.6
26.5
38.2

.009

17.19

Sig.

X2

.001

13.23

`

Age and gender seem to be the major points of departure between domestic plotters, foreign
fighters, and domestic non-plotters. Gender is significant: while females make up roughly 6
percent of foreign fighters and domestic plotters, they comprise nearly one third of the domestic
non-plotter group. While there is a significant difference in support type across age, it does not
support the original hypothesis, which predicted that domestic plotters would be younger, on
average, than foreign fighters. On the contrary, roughly 40 percent of foreign fighters in the
sample are under the age of twenty, while only 20.8 percent of the domestic plotters fall into that
age group. For the analyses, race was dichotomized into white and non-white. While not
significant, non-whites comprised proportionally less of the domestic non-plotter group (35.3
percent) than domestic plotters or foreign fighters, though they make up nearly half (45.1
percent) of the ISIS sample overall.
Table 7 contains the first of the two conjunctive analyses across support types and separates
the sample into domestic (domestic plotters and domestic non-plotters) and foreign supporters
(foreign fighters). While the data generated 38 total unique configurations (across 135 persons),
the most common demographic configuration of persons in the dataset (n=13) is a U.S. born,
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white male between the ages of 20 and 25. Individuals with this demographic configuration
tended to leave 46 percent of the time.

Case No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Table 7: Domestic vs. Foreign CACC
Age Range
Resident Status
Race
Gender
U.S. Born
U.S. Born
U.S. Born
U.S. Born
U.S. Born
U.S. Born
Legal Resident
U.S. Born
U.S. Born

Under 20
20 - 25
20 - 25
Over 30
Over 30
Under 20
Under 20
26 - 30
26 to 30

Non-white
White
White
White
Non-white
White
Non-white
Non-white
White

Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male

% Foreign
Fighter
70
50
46
45
44
38
33
20
14

N
10
10
13
11
9
8
6
5
7

The individuals that most often (70 percent of the time) fall into the foreign fighter category
are U.S. born, non-white individuals under the age of 20. This is likely due to a group of SomaliAmerican youths in Minnesota who all endeavored to join ISIS abroad. U.S. born, white and
non-white males between 26 and 30 years old are least likely to be coded as foreign fighters.
Roughly one third of the U.S. born, white males and legal resident status, non-white males under
20 opt to leave the United States. The remaining four dominant configurations of demographic
characteristics are foreign fighters between 44 percent and 50 percent of the time.

Case No.
1
2
3
4
5
6

Table 8: Domestic Plotter vs. Domestic Non-Plotter CACC
Age Range
Resident Status
Race
Gender
U.S. Born
26 - 30
White
Male
U.S. Born
20 – 25
White
Male
U.S. Born
Under 20
White
Male
U.S. Born
Over 30
Non-White
Male
U.S. Born
Over 30
Non-White
Male
U.S. Born
20 - 25
Non-White
Male

35

% Plotter
100
86
80
60
50
40

N
6
7
5
5
6
5

The next support type conjunctive analysis (displayed in Table 8) shows the dominant
configurations of those who choose to stay in the United States and separates them into violent
(domestic plotters) and non-violent (domestic non-plotters). Notably, U.S. born, white males
across all but the oldest age category are domestic plotters at least 80 percent of the time. When
the age range for these same individuals is 31 and older, that percent decreases to 50. If the 31 or
older U.S. born individual is non-white, however, the percent is slightly higher at 60 percent.
U.S. born, non-white males between the ages of 20 and 25 years are the least likely to be
domestic plotters, with 60 percent falling into the domestic non-plotter category.

Results II: Analysis of AQAM-ISIS Perpetrators and Incidents
The AQAM-ISIS analysis includes both person comparisons and incident comparisons. The
Chi Square results in Table 9 below indicate significant differences between ISIS and AQAM
perpetrators with regard to resident status and race. As indicated by the descriptive statistics,

Resident Status
n=108

Table 9: AQAM-ISIS Perpetrator Analysis
%
Sig.
ISIS
AQAM
U.S. Born
36.7
68.8
.002
Naturalized
14.6
16.7
Legal Resident
14.6
26.7
Illegal Resident
2.1
20.0

X2
14.403

Gender
n=117

Male
Female

95.7
4.3

93.8
6.3

.646

.211

Race
n=114

White
Non-white

82.1
17.9

57.4
42.6

.004

8.308

Age
n=114

Under 21
21 - 25
26-30
Over 30

9.1
33.3
24.2
33.3

20.8
29.2
31.3
18.8

.135

5.558
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both categories are generally male, and the proportion of ISIS male involvement is higher among
the incident perpetrators than the overall ISIS sample. This is consistent with the previous
analysis across ISIS support types that indicated a higher percentage of males as foreign fighters
and domestic plotters than domestic non-plotters and suggests that violent plotters in both
categories are more similar in gender distribution that the literature suggested.
The differences across resident status are also significant. In previous analyses of the ATS
data for all AQAM individuals, the proportion of illegal residents has been roughly 5 percent,
suggesting that incident perpetrators are more likely to be illegal residents than other types of
supporters. The difference in ages between AQAM and ISIS perpetrators is nonsignificant, and
while ISIS has a higher proportion of youth involvement (20.8 percent compared to 9.1 percent),
both categories have between 40-50 percent of their perpetrators under the age of 26.
From the incident Chi Square results in Table 10, we can see that there are also significant
differences between ISIS and AQAM incidents concerning the length of the planning cycle,
group size, weapon types, and target types. Plan cycle has been recoded for purposes of the
analysis into four categories based on quartiles of the overall data.

Plan Cycle
n=83

Table 10: AQAM-ISIS Incident Analysis
%
AQAM ISIS
Sig.
2 months or less
7.7
51.6
.000
2-4 months
15.4
35.5
4 months to 1 year
36.5
12.9
1 year or more
40.4
0.0

X2
35.410

Success
n=146

Unsuccessful
Successful

78.7
21.3

73.1
26.9

.440

.598

Num. Offenders
n=143

1
2–3
4 or more

47.9
27.7
24.5

44.9
44.9
10.2

.044

6.259

37

Weapon
n=139
Target Type
n=139

Table 10: AQAM-ISIS Incident Analysis (Cont.)
%
AQAM ISIS
Sig.
Explosives
69.0
42.3
.007
Firearms
21.8
36.5
Other
9.2
21.2
Military
Government
Civilian
Business/Financial
Transportation
Other

19.4
21.5
10.8
16.1
16.1
16.1

28.3
13.0
23.9
6.5
4.3
23.9

.029

X2
9.898

12.484

One of the more interesting findings presented here is the lack of variation in success rates
between the two groups despite variation across other incident factors. The plan cycle lengths
between the two categories are markedly difference and highly significant, with ISIS plan cycles
being far shorter. Just over half of ISIS incidents in the sample have a plan cycle of two months
or less, while over three quarters of AQAM incidents have plan cycles longer than four months.
The dataset does not include any ISIS incidents with planning cycles over one year. Both
ideological categories fail far more than they succeed, though ISIS incidents have a slightly
higher success rate, contrary to my original hypothesis.
In addition, group size for ISIS incidents tends to be smaller, with nearly 90 percent having
groups of three persons or fewer. While the bulk of AQAM incident groups are also on the
smaller side, roughly one quarter have groups of four or more. As predicted, AQAM incidents
include a higher percentage of explosives as the intended or utilized weapon. ISIS incidents are
relatively evenly split between firearms and explosives as the weapon of choice. Finally, while I
did not predict the type of difference, the results pertaining to target type are significant and
indicate that ISIS incidents are proportionally more likely to have both civilian and military
targets, while AQAM incidents have a proportionally higher rate of government targets.
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Finally, I utilized CACC to examine success rates across the incidents in the sample. The
number of successful incidents is small, therefore the number of cases in this conjunctive
analysis are below the 5 case threshold utilized in the person analysis. To raise the number of
cases, I did not include plan cycle in this CACC for two reasons: first, only 74 of the 146
incidents had a plan cycle measure available due to coding time constraints. Second, I ran a
cross-tab analysis of incident factors against success and found plan cycle for the sample to be
nonsignificant with success. Finally, I combined the target type variable into three options:
Military/Government, Civilian/Business, and Transportation/Other. The results of those
crosstabs are available in the attached appendix. Table 11 shows case configurations resulting in
success at least 25 percent of the time.

Case No.

Affiliation

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

ISIS
AQAM
ISIS
AQAM
AQAM
AQAM
ISIS
AQAM
AQAM

Table 11: Incident Success CACC
Num.
Target
Weapon
Offenders
Miltary/Gov
Other
1
Trans/Other
Firearm
1
Civ/Bus
Firearm
1
Civ/Bus
Explosive
4 or more
Civ/Bus
Other
4 or more
Miltary/Gov
Firearm
1
Miltary/Gov
Firearm
1
Miltary/Gov
Explosive
1
Civ/Bus
Explosive
1

%
Successful
100
100
100
75
67
33
29
29
25

N
3
4
5
4
3
6
7
7
8

From Table 11, we can see that ISIS incidents involving one offender utilizing a firearm
against a civilian/business target, ISIS incidents involving one offender utilizing some other
weapon type against a military or government target, and AQAM incidents utilizing a firearm
against a transportation/other type of target involving one offender are successful 100 percent of
the time. While this is certainly a striking rate of success, it is important to note that only the
ISIS incidents against civilian/business targets meet the 5-case threshold. AQAM incidents
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involving larger groups (four or more offenders) targeting civilians/businesses with explosives
also have a fairly high rate of success at 75 percent. AQAM incidents with the same group size
and target but utilizing some other kind of weapon are nearly as successful, at 67 percent.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to conduct exploratory analysis of ISIS in the United States.
While the scope of the analysis was somewhat limited, the results shed light on some important
patterns and differences across ISIS support types and the broader American Islamic Extremist.
This chapter includes further discussion of the analysis concerning two major findings: patterns
across ISIS perpetrators of violence in the United States and the similarity of success rates
between ISIS and AQAM incidents. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the
limitations of this project and suggestions for future research.

Key Conclusions
Predicting Violent Support in the United States
The first research question considered ISIS persons independent of AQAM and examined the
type of individuals who engage with ISIS’ ideology as domestic plotters, foreign fighters, or
domestic non-plotters. The results indicated that there were significant differences across support
types, particularly by gender and age group. Individuals in the age range of 20 and under
comprise 40 percent of the foreign fighter sample included in this study, while nearly the same
proportion (37.1 percent) of domestic non-plotters are comprised of individuals 31 and older.
There are a number of potential explanations for these differences. Criminological research
concerning traditional, non-terrorism related crimes and violence routinely references to the agecrime curve and gender gap in explaining certain individuals’ proclivities toward violence. Older
individuals may simply not be as willing to engage in violence or sacrifice stable aspects of their
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lives to travel abroad to fight, and instead support the cause by recruiting or spreading
propaganda.
ISIS’ recruitment strategy and propaganda may also influence the way individuals engage the
ideology. The group’s propaganda materials rarely feature women. On the occasion that a
woman is being recruited, it is in a more supportive, rather than violent, role. Essentially, women
may simply not be being recruited into violence. On the other hand, ISIS projects to youthful,
aspiring men the romanticized image of a brave fighter.
The goal of the analysis was to examine the immediate threat to the United States that a
person poses. Based on the analysis here, white, U.S. born males younger than thirty but older
than twenty comprise the group with the greatest likelihood of perpetrating a violent domestic
incident. The ability to predict whether someone will engage in domestic terrorism would be
important to law enforcement; investigation strategies and precautions may be different if
investigators believe an individual may leave the country or could be plotting an incident.
Understanding the types of individuals who plot domestically could logically help guide
resources in more efficient and effective directions, increasing law enforcement’s preventative
capability.

ISIS as a Uniquely Domestic Threat
Another important finding from the analyses presented here is the proportion of ISIS
supporters generally and ISIS domestic plot perpetrators who are U.S. born – 62.4 percent and
68.8 percent, respectively. By comparison, only 36.7 percent of AQAM perpetrators in the
sample are U.S. born. These differences may have important implications for law enforcement
and immigration policy. The characterization of terrorists categorized as Islamic Extremist in the
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United States as foreigners potentially in the country illegally does not appear to carry with
regard to ISIS. Resident type was nonsignificant in the analysis across ISIS support types. Only
the domestic non-plotter category involved more than half non-U.S. born individuals.
This is not to suggest law enforcement should focus its efforts solely on U.S. born
individuals who express support for ISIS. While ISIS’ strategy in the United States, as previously
discussed, has not been marked by sending individuals directly connected to the central group to
the United States, this could potentially change as ISIS continues to lose territory abroad.

Success Rates and Incident Configurations
The incident level analysis revealed several statistically significant differences between
AQAM and ISIS incidents. Despite differences in the length of the planning cycle, weapon
types, target types, and group size, the analysis indicated very similar success rates. Though ISIS
incidents have a slightly higher proportion of success compared to AQAM incidents (26.9
percent compared to 21.3 percent), the difference was nonsignificant.
Logically, each of these plot factors can influence success rates. The difference in plan cycle
also suggests differences in the planning process preceding ISIS and AQAM incidents. Plots
based around different weapon or target types may require different preparatory behaviors and
subsequently result in a higher likelihood of failure. For example, differences in target types may
result in more visible preparatory activities. A perpetrator may have a more difficult time
conducing surveillance on a military target (which would presumably have heightened security)
versus a public place, such as a park. Differences in success rate across weapon types may be
due to the feasibility and accessibility of certain weapons. ISIS incidents seem to be
characterized by plot configurations that predict higher success rates: plots involving 1 offender,
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utilize firearms or explosives, and target civilians. This is concerning as it may indicate that ISIS
plots have the potential to be increase in success rate.

Limitations and Future Research
While this project expanded on previous research, it is certainly not without limitations. The
subject matter itself creates inherent restrictions. Terrorism is a rare occurrence to begin with,
and limiting it to one ideological category (Islamic Extremism) and halving that category within
itself lends small sample sizes. With limited existing literature, analysis is also limited to an
exploratory role at this phase to guide further academic research and quantitative analysis.
In addition, ISIS is a very contemporary phenomenon. The most recent incident included in
the analysis occurred mere weeks before the project was completed, and with such a relatively
small pool of individuals and incidents available, the data is subject to rapid change with each
new case. While there are also clear differences in the types of attacks and persons characterized
as being AQAM versus ISIS, the most important determinant may simply be the year the
individual radicalized. ISIS is, for lack of a better term, the current “big man on campus.” It is a
social media savvy organization, selling a glorified image of violence and war that appears to
appeal to a different type of person than those attracted to AQAM. Individuals with a proclivity
to Islamic extremism would be hard-pressed to explore the ideology without coming into contact
with the group’s materials or influence.
In light of the threat posed by ISIS, understanding how the group manifests in the United
States is paramount to prevention. This study identified some key points of departure across ISIS
supporters as well as between AQAM and ISIS supporters and incidents. Age and gender seem
to be strong indicators of whether or not an individual will engage or plan to engage in domestic
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terrorism, and ISIS perpetrators appear to be different than their AQAM counterparts largely in
resident status and race.
When considering violent incidents in the United States, the analysis indicates that the threat
posed by ISIS is also measurably different: ISIS incidents involve shorter planning cycles, fewer
persons, a higher proportion of potentially readily accessible weapons (firearms), and a greater
tendency toward civilian targets. While these configurations appear to be more successful than
others, ISIS does not appear to be more successful than AQAM at perpetrating violence in the
United States. Future research should focus on exploring these differences to help paint a more
accurate picture and examine how law enforcement has been relatively consistent in foiling plots
despite the changing nature of the Islamic Extremist threat.
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Appendix 1: Incident Success Chi Square Analysis

Plan Cycle
N=83

Incident Success Chi Square Analysis
Unsuccessful
Successful
2 months or less
20.3
36.8
2-4 months
21.9
26.3
4 months to 1 year
32.8
10.5
1 year or more
25.0
26.3

Sig.
.219

X2
4.423

Num. Offenders
N=143

1
2–3
4 or more

39.4
41.3
19.3

70.6
8.8
20.6

.001

13.522

Weapon
N=139

Explosives
Firearms
Other

69.5
22.9
7.6

26.5
41.2
32.4

.000

22.717

Target Type
N=139

Military
Government
Civilian
Business/Financial
Transportation
Other

23.8
21.0
7.6
13.3
15.2
19.0

17.6
11.8
38.2
11.8
2.9
17.6

.001

20.783
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